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ESSAY
THE SPLIT BENEFIT: THE PAINLESS WAY
TO PUT SKIN BACK IN THE
HEALTH CARE GAME
ChristopherRobertsont

This Essay proposes a solution to the growth of health care costs, focusing on the sector of expensive, and often unproven, treatments. Political,
legal, and market limits prevent insurersand physiciansfrom rationingcare
or putting downward pressureon prices. Because the insurerbears the cost,
the patient is also not sensitive to price, and thus consumes even low-value
but high-cost treatments.
The traditionalcost-sharing solution is onerous for patients with limited wealth. When treatments can cost $25,000 or more, one cannot expect
the median patient to pay a significant portion thereof Instead, patients
often enjoy supplemental insuranceor exhaust their cost-sharinglimits, and
thus enjoy full insurancewhen making such a consumption decision. Raising the limits is a painful solution, since it would reduce access to care and
cause medical bankruptcies.
A new solution emerges from the recognition that insurance currently
provides only an "in-kind" benefit, paid to the providerratherthan the beneficiary. Instead, under a "split benefit, "for expensive treatments (costing,
say, $100, 000), the insurershould considersatisfying its coverage obligation
by paying a portion (say, $10,000) directly to the patient. The patient then
decides whether to spend that portion on the treatment. If so, the insurer
pays the balance ($90,000) to the provider, thereby insuring access. If the
patient instead declines the care, he or she can save or spend the money on
anything else. The insurer saves the balance ($90,000).
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Because it is fungible, the split benefit creates an opportunity cost, causing some patients to decline the expensive treatment in lieu of medical and
nonmedical alternatives that they value more highly. Strikingly, the split
benefit is consistent with current insurance contracts and regulations,since
it does not change coverage or the size of the benefit. That feature makes the
split benefit practicable, unlike many other theoretical solutions. Moreover,
the insurer can exercise the split benefit as a unilateraloption whenever it is
most likely to save money.
The split benefit is a better solution than traditionalcost sharing or
rationing by insurers or physicians, which all reduce access to care. The
proposal serves patients' autonomy by giving them additional options and
reduces the distortion in the larger economy caused by nonfungible insurance. This Essay considers objections, including the possibility of stimulatingfalse demand and the need to protect patients who are unable to decide
for themselves-both of which the appropriatelegal mechanisms can address.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. health care spending has reached approximately $2.5 trillion
or 17.6% of GDP.' We spend more on health care than on food,
housing, transportation, or anything else.2 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) leaders have argued that "our country's financial health
will in fact be determined primarily by the growth rate of per capita
1

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE

& MEDICAID SERvS.,

OFFICE OF THE AcrUARY, NATIONAL HEALTH

EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONs 2010-2020: FORECAsT SUMMARY 4 tbl.,

available at https://
www.cms.gov/nationalhealthexpenddata/downloads/proj20lO.pdf.
2 See Timothy StoltzfusJost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An Essay on
Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 537, 537 (2006).
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health care costs."3 At the household level, health care spending
leads to personal bankruptcies and home foreclosures. 4
The states are also suffering from the health care cost burden.
"Last year, Medicaid spending was estimated to account for nearly a
quarter of total state spending-the largest portion of their budgetsand it's getting only more expensive." 5 These costs have assumed constitutional proportions, as the Supreme Court has recently taken up
the allegations that the federal government mandates have commandeered the state budgets.6
It will only get worse. As shown in Figure 1, experts expect national health spending to comprise 20% of GDP by 2020, with health
care costs inflation dramatically outpacing every other sector of the
economy.7 This would amount to nearly $13,500 for each American,
nearly three times the cost in 1999.8 The CBO projects that unless the
system implements significant changes, health spending will grow to
half of all U.S. spending.9 One former secretary of health and human
services called this the "health-care inflation monster" that is eating
our economy.' 0

3

Peter R. Orszag & Philip Ellis, The Challenge of Rising Health Care Costs-A View from

the Congressional Budget Office, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1793, 1793 (2007).
4
See David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results
of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 741, 744-45 (2009); Christopher Tarver Robertson
et al., Get Sick, Get Out: The Medical Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures,18 HEALTH MATRIX

65, 90-94 (2008).
5 Ezekiel J. Emanuel, What We Give Upfor Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2012, 5:41
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/what-we-give-up-for-healthcare/.
6 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
7
See CTRs. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 1, at 4 tbl.L
8
See id.; see also Edward J. Larson, MedicalRationing, Death Panels and the Rising Cost of
Health Care: Whittier Law School Health Law Symposium Paper, 33 WHITrIER L. REv. 13, 15
(2011) (reviewing this data).
9 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE GROWTH OF HEALTH
CARE SPENDING 5 (2008) [hereinafter CoNG. BUDGET OFFICE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE],

available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8947/01-31-TechHealth.pdf.
10 Robert Pear, Reagan Has Achieved Many Goals, but Some Stir Opposition, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1984, at A18 (quoting Margaret Heckler).
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PROJECTED SPENDING ON HEALTH CARE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS
DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP)
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Source: Congressional Budget Office
Note: Amounts for Medicare are net of beneficiaries' premiums. Amounts for Medicaid are
federal spending only.

For both public and private health insurers, reform to address the
cost conundrum seems inevitable. The question is how. The default
rule will be the sorts of crude policies that also cut into access, choice,
and health. For example, states are slashing their Medicaid budgets
nationwide." Arizona stopped paying for certain organ transplants.' 2
Hawaii refuses to pay for hospital stays of more than ten days for most
patients, regardless of whether the hospital can safely discharge the
patient.' 3 Other states are doing likewise.14 These solutions are far
from elegant. They are zero-sum games, which the patients lose.
A more elegant solution requires closer attention to the causes.
It is tempting to suppose that demographic changes drive this growth.
Yet, the United States spends 20 to 30 percent more per capita than
countries with excellent health care systems and similarly aging populations, such as France and Germany.15 As Ezekiel Emanuel writes,
"The truth is, the United States is not getting 20 or 30 percent better
11
See Phil Galewitz, More States Limiting Medicaid Hospital Stays, USA TODAY, Oct. 31,
2011, at 1A.
12

Id.

13

Id.
Id.
See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, How Much Does Health Care Cost, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 2011,

14

15
at SR5.
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health care or results than other countries."' 6 And, even within the
United States, from one region to another, there are large disparities
in the amount spent on health care, which demographic and health
factors cannot explain.1 7 Areas with double, or even triple, the
amount of spending per patient do not show better outcomes as a
result.18

"[M]ost analysts have concluded that the bulk of the long-term
rise resulted from the health care system's use of new medical services
that were made possible by technological advances. . . ."19 If this market were efficient-and if such spending were making us healthier
and happier than alternative spending could-then we would count
this trend as progress.2 0 Closer analysis reveals, however, that this
market is failing to align our health care consumption choices with
our values, which is to say that much of this money is wasted. This
failure results from a complex set of well-intentioned laws that mandate coverage of expensive, and often unproven, treatments but effectively prevent anyone from weighing the costs of those treatments.
First, public or private insurance covers most of the patients who
make the majority of health care spending choices. 2' The recent
health care reform legislation imposes a legal mandate on employers
to cover their workers and on individuals to enroll themselves, and
helps subsidize the costs of premiums. 22 Thus, as we approach universal coverage, insurers will handle nearly all health care spending decisions. Therefore, the question of how to control health care costs is
16

Id.

17

See id.

See id. But see Richard A. Cooper, States with More Health CareSpending Have BetterQuality Health Care: Lessons about Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. w103, w112-13 (2009) (noting
that quality "depends on total health care spending" and "relates to a broad array of sociodemographic characteristics," and that "Medicare spending is a poor proxy for overall
health care spending.").
19 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, supra note 9, at 1; see also Mark A.
Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers'Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv.
1637, 1664 (1992) ("According to most observers, a driving force behind the increase in
health care spending is new technology.").
20 See generally Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Aspirin, Angioplasty, and Proton
Beam Therapy: The Economics of Smarter Health Care Spending 1, 3 (Sept. 9, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2011/2011.
BaickerandChandra.paper.pdf (discussing estimates as to whether it is optimal to spend as
much as a third of the U.S. economy on health care, but arguing that the spending is likely
less than optimal).
21 See CRs. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH ExPENDITURES BY
TYPE OF SERVICE AND SOURCE OF FUNDS, CY1960-2011, available at http://www.cms.gov/
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpend
Data/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (showing that public and private insurers
pay over eighty-eight percent of health care costs).
22 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2006); see also Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1,4-20 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (discussing Congress's rationale for the mandate and upholding the mandate as
constitutional).
18
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largely a question of how to design public and private insurance policies so that insurers cover patients for the treatments they demand but
also minimize wasteful spending.2 3
When deciding whether and how to cover the costs of health care
treatments-including drugs, devices, surgeries, imaging, tests, and
other procedures-a rational insurer will be primarily concerned
about whether they are cost-effective and efficient. Some treatments-such as blood pressure and diabetes drugs-are known to be
efficient for health insurers. Spending more money on these procedures actually saves the insurer money by preventing the need for expensive procedures later.2 4 A recent wave of research has endorsed
the idea of Value-Based Insurance Design (VBID), wherein insurers
reduce or eliminate co-pays and deductibles for such treatments, and
perhaps even create affirmative programs to encourage their adoption
and adherence. 25
At the other end of the cost-effectiveness spectrum is a vast domain of expensive treatments that have small or unproven effectiveness. The CBO has noted that "[a]lthough estimates vary, some
experts believe that less than half of all medical care is based on or
supported by adequate evidence about its effectiveness."2 6 When
Medicare Administrator Donald Berwick stepped down from his post
in 2011, he argued that 20 to 30 percent of health care spendingmore than $1 trillion a year-was waste.2 7 "Much is done that does
not help patients at all," Dr. Berwick said, "and many physicians know
it.""92

One might suppose that if the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves a drugs or device, then it is proven effective.
23 See generally Robert H. Blank, Regulatory Rationing: A Solution to Health Care Resource
Allocation, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1573 (1992) (discussing a more fundamental approach to this
question). Robert Blank's paper takes for granted the primary features of the American
health care system circa 2012.
24
See generally Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their
Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369, 378, 381 (1995) (compiling studies of costeffectiveness).

25
See Michael E. Chernew et al., Value-Based InsuranceDesign, 26 HEALTH AFF. w195,
w195, w197 (2007).
26

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL
TREATMENTS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AN EXPANDED FEDERAL ROLE 11 (2007) [hereinafter
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL TREAT-

MENTS], available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/MainText.3.1.shtml

(cit-

ing LEIGHANNE OLSEN ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L AcAos., LEARNING WHAT WORKS
BEST: THE NATION'S NEED FOR EVIDENCE ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH CARE

app. A, at 341 (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK64787/pdf/
TOC.pdf).
27 Editorial, Candid Advice from a Health Care Visionary, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, at
A34; Robert Pear, Health Official Takes Parting Shot at Waste,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2011, at
A23.
28 Pear, supra note 27, at A23.
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However, the FDA's statutory authority requires only that manufacturers prove minimal effectiveness compared to a placebo, which is to say
that the product is better than nothing.2 9 Physicians often still must
guess about whether the new drug or device will prove more effective
than standard treatments.3 0 Even when a drug has FDA approval and
proven effectiveness, this does not necessarily mean that the drug is
cost-effective. Indeed, the FDA statute does not authorize it to consider costs-only medical risks and benefits. 3 1 Even more, the FDA
statute also allows physicians to prescribe drugs and devices off-label
for other unapproved diseases and conditions without any proof or
FDA review of efficacy.3 2 The law actually prevents the FDA from taking an active role in controlling costs in the American health care
system.
Thus, there are many expensive drugs, devices, and other treatments that are arguably not worth their cost. Consider, for example,
the $80,000 treatment for breast cancer called high-dose chemotherapy plus autologous bone marrow transplant (HDC-ABMT). 33 The
HDC-ABMT treatment became very popular in the 1990s, even
though clinical trials had not proven the treatment effective.3 4 At
first, insurers refused to pay.35 "Their refusals led to an avalanche of
29 SeeJerry Avorn, FDA Standans-GoodEnough for Government Work, 353 NEw ENG.J.
MED. 969, 969 (2005). See generally Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316 (2008)
(analyzing the preemptive effect of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) statute
for medical devices); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979) (discussing the
purpose and function of the FDA approval process and upholding a ban on the sale of
unapproved drugs).
30
See generally Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Experimental Study of Comparative Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 76
Fed. Reg. 38663, 38664 (July 1, 2011) (noting that "few head-to-head clinical trials have
been conducted"); Sanket S. Dhruva et al., Strength of Study Evidence Examined by thePDA in
Premarket Approval of Cardiovascular Devices, 302 JAMA 2679, 2679 (concluding that
"[pl remarket approval of cardiovascular devices by the FDA is often based on studies that
lack adequate strength and may be prone to bias").
31
See Peter J. Neumann et al., The FDA and Regulation of Cost-Effectiveness Claims, 15
HEALTH AFF. 54, 55 (1996). Still, the insurers' actuaries may have developed such data
internally, and recent public policy initiatives should expand our knowledge in this area.
See Recovery Act Allocates $1.1 Billion for Comparative Effectiveness Research, U.S. DEPARTMENT
HEALTH & Hum. SERVICEs, http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/os/cerbios.html

(last

visited Mar. 12, 2013).
32 See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006) ("Nothing in this [Act] shall be construed to limit or
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any
legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health
care practitioner-patient relationship."); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S.
341, 350-51 (2001) (discussing off-label use in the context of medical devices).
33 See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Controversy over High-Dose Chemotherapy with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantfor Breast Cancer,20 HEALTH AFF. 101, 101-02
(2011).
34 See id. at 103-05 (describing 1990s clinical trials' inability prove the efficacy of the
treatment).
35 Id. at 103.
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litigation, accompanied by intensive political lobbying by patient advocacy groups."3 6 For example, the Minnesota legislature mandated
that insurers cover it.?
"These legal and political pressures led most health plans to capitulate and pay for the treatment by the mid-1990s." 3 8 More than
41,000 patients consumed HDC-ABMT during the 1990s at an aggregate cost of about $3.28 billion.3 9 By 2000, new research showed that
the "insurers were correct" in their initial refusals to pay. 40 But, of
course, the money could not be unspent. Nor can those patients reverse the serious risks and side effects that accompanied this ineffective treatment.4 1 For hundreds of other expensive and novel
treatments, we now find ourselves in the same situation of epistemic
uncertainty where insurers must pay for unproven treatments. 4 2
Likewise, consider Avastin, which, at $88,000 per treatment, is
eleventh on a list of the fifteen most expensive drugs.4 3 Genentech
marketed Avastin for the treatment of breast cancer after the FDA
granted accelerated approval for that use in 2008.44 The FDA based
its approval on two open-label studies that showed that the drug
slowed the rate of tumor growth but showed "no evidence of an effect
on overall survival or improved symptoms."4 5 Still, oncologists readily
prescribed Avastin to their desperate patients. 4 6
Subsequent double-blinded studies failed to replicate the early
findings. 47 In 2011, after an extensive process, the FDA commissioner
exercised her statutory authority to revoke Avastin as a treatment for
Id. at 102.
See Karen G. Gervais & Reinhard Priester, Mandatesfor Unproven Health CareInterventions, 79 MINN. MED. 52, 52 (1996).
38 Mello & Brennan, supra note 33, at 102.
39 See id. at 101-02. The aggregate cost is computed by multiplying the individual
price by the number of patients, both of which Mello and Brennan provide in their article.
36

7

40

See id.

41 See id. at 110 ("Acute-onset toxicities (in addition to vomiting and diarrhea) include sepsis, pulmonary failure, veno-occlusive disease, cardiac failure, nephrotoxicity,
hemorrhagic cystitis, and cardiac toxicity.").
42 See text accompanying notes 103-19 (discussing reasons why insurers feel so compelled to pay).
43 Merrill Goozner, An Extra Month of Life: Is It Really Worth the Cost?, FiSCAL TIMES
(June 30, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/06/30/An-Extra-Month-ofLife-Is-it-Really-Worth-the-Cost.aspx#pagel.
44 See Proposal to Withdraw Approval for the Breast Cancer Indication for AVASTIN
(Bevacizumab), Docket No. FDA-2010-N-0621, at 23 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Food & Drug Admin. Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Decision of the Commissioner] (decision
of the commissioner). But cf Goozner, supra note 43 (describing how the FDA revoked
approval in 2010 for the Genentech drug Avastin for the treatment of breast cancer).
45 Decision of the Commissioner, supranote 44, at 13. The studies submitted to obtain accelerated approval (the E2100 study and the AVF211 9 g study) considered tumor
growth to constitute disease progression (PFS). Id. at 18.
46 See Goozner, supra note 43.
47 See Decision of the Commissioner, supra note 44, at 23-25.
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breast cancer, noting that its side effects presented very real dangers
to patients (including a risk of death) not balanced by a proven, real
benefit.48 Cancer patients protested the decision, calling it "nothing
short of a death sentence" for those who rely upon the drug.4 9
The decision will likely be taken up in court, but, for now, FDA
revocation prevents the drug manufacturer from marketing Avastin
for the treatment of breast cancer. However, despite the FDA's revocation and because Avastin has at least one other FDA-approved indication on its label, oncologists can still freely prescribe Avastin for the
treatment of breast cancer.5 0 In turn, Medicare will continue to pay
for such treatments. 5 ' Some private insurers will likely follow suit.5 2
Treatments may be cost-effective for certain patients in certain
situations even while ineffective for others.5 3 For example, clinical
studies prove heart stents effective for use after a heart attack, and
surgeons implant more than one million each year, costing up to
$100,000 each.5 4 But stents are often used prophylactically in a domain that is not FDA-approved.5 5 A large randomized, controlled trial
(the gold standard for medical research) demonstrated that patients
who received stents prophylactically would have fared just as well on a
much cheaper (and safer) regimen of drugs. 5 6
Likewise, the United States is now rapidly dispensing artificial
hips and knees to its aging population. In the United States, nearly
Id. at 12, 40.
49 Andrew Pollack, ED.A. Revokes Approval of Avastin for Use as Breast CancerDrug, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, at B7.
50
See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006).
51
Medicare to Keep Payingfor ControversialCancerDrug Avastin, NATIONALJOURNAL (June
30, 2011, 3:55 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/healthcare/medicare-to-keeppaying-for-controversial-cancer-drug-avastin-20110630.
52
See Meredith Melnick, Medicare Will Continue to Pay for Avastin, TIME (July 1, 2011),
http://healthland.time.com/2011/07/01/medicare-will-continue-to-pay-for-avastin/
#ixzzlZY3VWGdc (noting that "[im]any private health insurance companies typically follow
Medicare's lead"); see also Goozner, supra note 43 (quoting Lee Newcomer, Senior Vice
President for Oncology at UnitedHealthcare, who stated that "regardless of what the FDA
does, we wouldn't make any changes").
53
See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Op-Ed., Cut Medicare, Help
Patients,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at A25 (describing inefficiencies in health care spending and the prophylactic use of stents in particular).
54
See id. While the cost of a stent can vary between $1,000 and $4,000, the average
cost of a stent procedure can vary from $30,000 to $100,000. See David Rosenfeld, Is American Medicine Too Stent Happy?, PAc. STANDARD (Apr. 17, 2010), http://psmag.com/health/
is-american-medicine-too-stent-happy-1 2861.
55 See Rosenfeld, supra note 54 ("An estimated 700,000 Americans will have a stent
implanted [in 2012] . . . either after a heart attack or stroke, to prevent one from happening. . . ."); Htut K. Win et al., ClinicalOutcomes and Stent Thrombosis FollowingOff-Label Use of
Drug-ElutingStents, 297 JAMA 2001, 2008 (2007) (finding that of the 3,323 patients enrolled in the study who had received stents, 54.7% had at least one off-label characteristic).
56
See William E. Boden et al., Optimal Medical Therapy With or Without PCI for Stable
Coronary Disease, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1503, 1503 (2007).
48
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one in twenty persons over the age of fifty now have artificial knees, at
a cost of about $40,000 each.5 7 The device industry continues to roll
out new models with higher and higher price tags that enthusiastic
surgeons suggest and install.5 8 Yet these newer devices often do not
perform any better than older, less expensive designs.59
"The list of procedures Medicare pays for that are proven to have
no benefit goes on and on."6 0 Whether provided by public insurers or
private health plans, this coverage likely exists because Americans demand access to such treatments.6 1 And these big-ticket treatments,
concentrated in a small portion of the population, consume a huge
portion of our health care budgets. In 2009, as much as 22% of
health care costs fell upon only 1 percent of the population, where
each individual incurred more than $90,000 in costs. 6 2
There can be little doubt that there is room for reform in this
sector of expensive treatments that have little or no proven effectiveness. In this, the most heavily regulated industry in America, we have
not yet found a way to provide access to high-end, cutting-edge treatments while being sensible about whether and when to actually consume them. Strikingly, the recent landmark health care reforms
barely scratch the surface in this domain of cost control-the legal
and political challenges make this issue just too difficult to resolve.6 3
This Essay explains how we are left with a legal and policy regime that
57

Lindsey Tanner, Nearly 1 in 20 U.S. Adults over 50 Have Fake Knees, WASH. TIMES

(Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/10/nearly-1-20-usadults-over-50-have-fake-knees/?page=all.
58 See Rajan Anand et al., What Is the Benefit of IntroducingNew Hip and Knee Prostheses?,
93J. BONE &JOINT SURGERY 51, 53 (2011) (arguing that newer prostheses are likely more
expensive than older models); James G. Wright et al., PhysicianEnthusiasm as an Explanation
for Area Variation in the Utilization of Knee Replacement Surgery, 37 MED. CARE 946, 953 (1999)

(suggesting that "surgeons' opinions or enthusiasm for the procedure" is a dominant factor contributing to higher rates of knee replacement).
59
Anand et al., supra note 58, at 53; see also V. Wylde et al., Total Knee Replacement: Is It
Really an Effective Procedurefor All?, 14 KNEE 417, 421 (2007) ("From the literature, it is
evident that there exists a substantial subsection of the TKR [total knee replacement] population who experience little or no benefit from the operation.").
60
Emanuel & Liebman, supra note 53.
61
See John A. Romley et al., Survey Results Show that Adults Are Willing to Pay Higher
InsurancePremiumsfor Generous Coverage of Specialty Drugs, 31 HEALTH AFF. 683, 683 (2012)

("US adults were estimated to be willing to pay an extra $12.94 on average in insurance
premiums per month for generous specialty-drug coverage-in effect, $2.58 for every dollar in out-of-pocket costs that they would expect to pay with a less generous insurance
plan.").
62
See Steven B. Cohen & William Yu, The Concentration and Persistence in the Level of
Health Expendituresover Time: Estimatesfor the U.S. Population, 2008-2009, MED. EXPENDITURE
PANEL SURV. (Jan. 2012), http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/datafiles/publications/st354/
stat354.pdf.
63

See David Orentlicher, Cost Containment and the PatientProtection and Affordable Care

Act, 6 FLA. INT'L U. L. REv. 67, 67-68 (2010) (arguing that, due to political pressures, "the
Act does far more about increasing access than it does about cutting costs").
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forces patients to pay in advance for coverage of treatments they think
they may someday want, creating a sunk cost. But it turns out that, at
the point of consumption, many patients would rationally prefer to
spend their money otherwise but are not allowed to do so. We have
created a systematic economic bias toward health care consumption.
This need not be the case.

This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I explains why and how the
current legal regime fails to prevent the overconsumption of expensive yet often unproven treatments. There are various efforts to get
physicians, insurers, and patients themselves all to ration care, but
they fail to solve the problem. These mechanisms constrict access,
create conflicts of interest, and impose onerous burdens on patients.
Part II elucidates the essential problem that health insurance is
paid to health care providers rather than the beneficiaries. This Part
lays out the alternative approach of a "split benefit," in which part is
paid directly to patients and thereby creates an opportunity cost for
the consumption of expensive treatments. A particularly attractive aspect of this proposal is that the health insurers can implement it right
now under current contracts and laws, without need for an expansion
of the health care regulatory bureaucracy. The split benefit is thus a
unilateral option the insurer can exercise in situations where it is most
likely to work.
Part III explores some of the practical and normative objections,
including co-optation by providers, autonomy, welfare, and the
specialness of health. The split benefit empowers individuals to decide for themselves how to best serve their own welfare.
This Essay concludes that the split benefit is a promising mechanism for reducing the financial burden of expensive and often ineffectual treatments, without reducing patient access to the care that they
prefer. Ultimately, the split benefit can reform a fundamental distortion in our economy, allowing our spending decisions to more efficiently reflect our values.
I

THE LIMITS or CURRENT RATIONING MECHANISMS
There are three parties in any health care consumption decision:
the physician, the payor, and the patient-and each of these could in
principle veto the consumption of low-value treatments. This Part explains why current efforts to reduce the consumption of these treatments-whether relying on the discretion of physicians, insurers, or
patients-fail to resolve the problem. One can understand all of
these efforts as forms of "rationing," as they distribute scarce health

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

932

[Vol. 98:921

care funds.64 The law, market, politics, and professional ethics all restrict the efficacy of these mechanisms for rationing and point toward
a better way.
A.

The Physician Rationer

Federal and state laws put the physician in the role of gatekeeper
between patients and treatments. 65 The physician has the power to
ration care. If the physician declines to write a prescription, the patient cannot consume the drug. With both veto power and clinical
expertise, we might view the physician as an ideal rationer. This section explains why physicians have their own reasons for prescribing
inefficient treatments and thus make poor rationers.
Bioethicists have criticized the suggestion that physicians should
take on the insurer's perspective because it could drive a wedge between the physician and his or her patient-client. 66 Accordingly, federal law prohibits health care plans covering Medicare or Medicaid
patients from making "specific" payments "directly or indirectly" to
physicians "as an inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary
services."6 7
There are contexts-such as managed care organizations
(MCOs)-in which insurers have created incentives for physicians to
ration care. 68 During the 1980s and 1990s, managed care became relatively popular. Soon thereafter, however, consumers became dissatisfied with limitations on their choices and challenged MCOs in a wave
of class action litigation.69 For various reasons, there was a widespread
retreat from efforts to incentivize physicians to ration care. 70 More
recently, there has been another move toward "pay-for-perform64

See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE

ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS

LAw,

ETHICS, AND

3-6 (1997).

65 See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. 107-377, ch. 675, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2006)) (defining prescription
drugs and requiring a doctor's prescription for such drugs).
66
See William M. Sage, Should the Patient Conquer?, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1505, 1509
(2010). But see Lois Snyder, American College of PhysiciansEthics Manual, 156 ANNALS INTER-

73, 86 (6th ed. Supp. 2012) (holding for the first time that "physicians' considered judgments should reflect the best available evidence in the biomedical literature,
NAL MED.

including data on .
67

.

. cost-effectiveness").

42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (i) (8) (A) (i) (2006).

See generally David Orendicher, Paying

Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 155, 162

(1996) (discussing these provisions).
68 See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 220-21 (2000) (holding that rationing is an
essential function of health maintenance organizations).
69
See Ronald Lagoe et al., Current andFutureDevelopments in Managed Care in the United
States and Implications for Europe, HEALTH RES. Pot'v & Sys. (Mar. 17, 2005), http://

www.health-policy-systems.com/content/3/1/4 ("[C]onsumer dissatisfaction with the business practices of plans, including apparent arbitrary denials of service and failure to pay
claims promptly, added fuel to provider complaints about low payment rates.").
70
Id.
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ance"71 and "accountable care organizations" (ACOs),72 which help to
align the interests of payors and physicians. It remains an open question as to whether these reforms will solve the problem, especially
when patients demand access to expensive, unproven treatments. 7 3
For the foreseeable future, many physicians will remain in fee-forservice relationships.7 4 As the president of the American Board of Internal Medicine has said,
One of the clearest reasons (for wasteful care] is our fee-for-service
payment system, where doctors get paid more for doing more. Very
few doctors do things that they know are wasteful, but if there's a
gray zone they could say, why not, it may help and it doesn't hurt
the patient.7 5
There are several other reasons why physicians may be biased toward costly treatment. Sheer optimism may give physicians an irrational belief in the effectiveness of unproven treatments.76
Alternatively, physicians may work under professional norms and personal ascriptions that encourage "heroic" treatments for desperate patients. 77 Money and relationships with the drug and device industries
may also bias physicians.78
Physicians sometimes set themselves up in self-referral situations
where they refer patients to their own offices for expensive treatments.7 9 Commonly, for example, a cardiologist may suggest a stent
71 See Christopher Robertson, Susannah Rose & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Effect of Financial Relationships on the Behaviors of Health Care Professionals:A Review of the Evidence, 40 J.L.,
MED. & ETHics 452, 458 (2012).
72 Jenny Gold, Accountable Care Organizations,Explained, NPR (Jan. 18, 2011, 8:21 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/04/01/132937232/accountable-care-organizations-explained.
73
See Lee N. Newcomer, ChangingPhysician Incentives for Cancer Care to Reward Better
Patient Outcomes Instead of Use of More Costly Drugs, 31 HEALTH AeF. 780, 781 (2012) (arguing

for reform of "buy and bill" practices and reviewing current reform efforts). But see Baicker
& Chandra, supranote 20, at 22 (arguing that ACOs may fail to reduce the consumption of
high cost treatments, "particularly if the latest shiny innovation increases market share").
74
See Mark G. Field, The Doctor-Patient Relationship in the Perspective of "Fee-for-Service"
and "Third-Party"Medicine, 2J. HEALTH & Hum. BEHAv. 252, 254 (1961).
75
Sarah Kliff, In Health Care, Determining What's Unnecessary, WASH. PosT WONKBLOG

(Jan. 19, 2012, 10:36 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/inhealth-care-determining-whats-unnecessary/2012/01/19/gIQAGo2mAQ.blog.html.
76
See generally Christine jolls, BehavioralEconomic Analysis of RedistributiveLegal Rules,
51 VAND. L. REv. 1653 passim (1998) (reviewing literature on "optimism bias").
77
Maureen Kwiecinski, To Be or Not to Be, Should Doctors Decide? Ethicaland Legal Aspects
ofMedical Futility Policies, 7 MARo. ELDER'S ADVISOR 313, 319, 320-21 & n.21 (2006) (finding

that "differences in treatment recommendations may also be associated with a number of
non-clinical factors").
78
I have reviewed this literature with coauthors. See Robertson, Rose & Kesselheim,
supra note 71, at 462.
7
Federal law prohibits certain self-referral and kickback relationships. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.952 (2011) (listing safe harbors). See generally Dayna Bowen Matthew, Tainted Prosecution of Tainted Claims: The Law, Economics, and Ethics of Fighting Medical Fraud Under the
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and then offer to perform the implantation procedure.8 0 One study
that examined physicians who bought ownership stakes in specialty
hospitals to which they could then refer patients found that the "introduction of financial incentives linked to ownership coincided with a
significant change in the practice patterns of physician owners."8 1
The authors observed a sixty-times increase in complex spinal fusion
surgeries by the physicians that bought in.82 In other fields, such as
oncology, scholars have documented physicians following the
money.8 3 Since 1989, there have been three rounds of lawmaking to
revise and tighten the Stark Law that regulates physician referral relationships,8 4 but the target keeps moving.
Further, physicians rely upon industry-created scientific research.8 5 Judge Jack Weinstein writes, "[t]he pervasive commercial
bias found in today's research laboratories means studies are often
lacking in essential objectivity, with the potential for misinformation,
skewed results, or cover-ups."8 6 Similarly, an Institute of Medicine report concluded that "[s]everal systematic reviews and other studies
provide substantial evidence that clinical trials with industry ties are
more likely to have results that favor industry."8 7 Nonetheless, some
physicians believe the science and are skewed in their prescribing decisions. Many other physicians appear to discount such science and
must rely upon their own anecdotal experiences, which may be
skewed in other ways. 88
Civil False Claims Act, 76 IND. L.J. 525, 554 (2001) (discussing the differences between the

self-referral law and the antikickback statute).
80
See David C. Levin et al., The ChangingRoles of Radiologists, Cardiologists,and Vascular
Surgeons in Percutaneous PeripheralArterial Interventions Duringa Recent Five-Year Interval, 2 J.
AM. C. RADIOLOGY 39, 41 (2005).
81 Jean M. Mitchell, Do FinancialIncentives Linked to Ownership of Specialty HospitalsAffect
Physicians' Practice Patterns?,46 MED. CARE 732, 736 (2008).
82 Id. at 735.
83
See generally Mireille Jacobson et al., How Medicare's Payment Cutsfor CancerChemotherapy Drugs Changed Patterns of Treatment, 29 HEALTH Ae. 1391, 1391 (2010) (assessing how

"substantially reduced payment rates for chemotherapy drugs ... affected the likelihood
and setting of chemotherapy treatment for Medicare beneficiaries").
84
85

See sources cited supra note 79.
See generally Christopher T. Robertson, The Money Blind: How to Stop Industry Bias in
Biomedical Science, Without Violating the First Amendment, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 358, 362 (2011)

(reviewing this literature).
86 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev'd sub nom.
UFCW Local 1776 v, Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 133 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing on the
question of causation).
87

INST. OF MED., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRAC-

TICE 104 (Bernard Lo & Marilyn

J. Field eds., 2009).

88 See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., A Randomized Study of How PhysiciansInterpret Research
FundingDisclosures, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1119, 1124 (2012) (showing that physicians tend

to discount the reliability of such research, even though industry funds most of the research testing the efficacy of drugs and devices).
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Most physicians also accept money and industry perks. 9 Drug
and device manufacturers actively promote their products through
"detailing" visits to physicians' offices, providing physicians with a onesided view of the scientific literature about safety and efficacy.Y0 Many
attribute changes in physicians' prescribing decisions to these
relationships.9 1
Overall, the wide variation in health expenditures per patient
suggests that some physicians are much more attentive to evidencebased medicine and cost.9 2 The foregoing considerations simply show
why physicians are not the complete solution to the problem addressed by this Essay: the consumption of expensive treatments with
little or no proven efficacy.
B.

The Insurer Rationer

Insurers could simply refuse to pay for high-cost, low-value treatments by saying that they are not "medically necessary"-the criterion
under most insurance contracts. 3 One might suppose that insurers
are the ideal rationers to make this assessment about the cost-benefit
profile of a treatment given that they have the aggregate perspective
of millions of insureds.
Abroad, it is more common for insurers to simply refuse to cover
a treatment. For example, Britain's National Health System (NHS) is
moving to cut Avastin's coverage for breast cancer, along with many

other drugs, such as Erbitux, which costs $128,000 per treatment.9 4
Given that the United Kingdom spends less than half as much of its
GDP on health care but reports significantly higher life expectancy
and health care quality, it may be tempting to adopt such an overt
rationing policy in the United States. 9 5
89

See Eric G. Campbell et at, Physician Professionalismand Changes in Physician-Industry

Relationshipsfrom 2004 to 2009, 170 ARcmIVES INTERNAL MED. 1820, 1820 (2010) (finding

that of surveyed physicians, 63.8% received drug samples, 70.6% food and beverages,
18.3% reimbursements, and 14.1% payments for professional services).
90 See generally Robertson, Rose & Kesselheim, supra note 71, at 39 (reviewing the literature on the biasing impact of these detailing visits).
91

Id.

92 See sources cited supra notes 15-18
93 See generally Hall & Anderson, supra note 19, at 1640-41 (discussing the varied use
of the phrase "medical necessity" to extend or refuse insurance coverage for certain treatments); William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical Necessity, TherapeuticBenefit, and the
Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DuKE L.J. 597, 601 (2003) (same).
94 See Neil Lancefield, Breast Cancer Drug Avastin 'Not Effective' Says Nice, INDEPENDENT
(Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/healthnews/breast-cancerdrug-avastin-not-effective-says-nice- 7 65 7 187.html; Roxanne Nelson, Access to Expensive CancerDrugs Limited in Both the US and UK, MEDSCAPE (Jan. 14, 2010), http:/
/www.medscape.com/viewarticle/7151 10.
95 See Larson, supra note 8, at 22; UK Comes Tap on End ofLife Care-Report,BBC NEWS
(July 14, 2010, 7:11 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-10634371 (describing a re-
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In America, public and private insurers do utilize this strategy of
refusing to pay. Medicare generally excludes drugs that are not at all
FDA-approved and excludes alternative treatments such as acupuncture.96 And some insurers have indicated that they will not pay for
Avastin for breast cancer.9 7 Insurers also impose pre-utilization reviews and "fail first" policies that require patients to try inexpensive
treatments before seeking reimbursement for more expensive
treatments.9 8
Still, the insurer's ability to ration is, and should be, severely limited. There are three reasons. Insurers are at an epistemic disadvantage. Their rationing depends on questionable normative
assumptions. And, they have conflicts of interest that may bias their
assessments. Consider each problem in turn.
First, in cases where a physician recommends an expensive treatment, there may be a reasonable dispute between the physician and
the insurer. The physician, unlike the insurer, has hands-on knowledge of the particular patient.
Second, economists have developed metrics for measuring health
improvements, such as an increase in quality-adjusted life-years
(QALYs), to which they then assign dollar values.9 9 If the dollar value
of the benefit is greater than the dollar value of the costs, then the
treatment is arguably worthwhile. These efforts are notoriously controversial, in part because "objective criteria for determining the value
patients receive from treatment are lacking." 100 As one commentator
explains,
QALYs also have their fierce opponents who argue that they are
unjust and offensive, even if inevitable. They reject outright the
idea of ranking treatments for medical rationing and they object to

port by the Economist Intelligence Unit that ranked the United Kingdom's system ahead
of the United States' system).
96 See Your Medicare Coverage, MEDICARE, http://www.medicare.gov/Coverage/
Home.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
97
See, e.g., Deborah Kotz, Will Mass. Breast Cancer Patients Lose Coverage for Avastin,
Bos. GLOBE (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.boston.com/Boston/dailydose/2011/10/will-massbreast-cancer-patients-lose-coverage-for-avastin/mufDuqsDUqYuteyli5yRAM/index.html.
98
See Hall & Anderson, supra note 19, at 1654 (describing precertification processes);
Stephen B. Soumerai, Benefits and Risks of Increasing Restrictions on Access to Costly Drugs in
Medicaid, 23 HEALTH AFF. 135, 136 (2004) (describing "fail first" policies that require patients to try a cheaper drug before escalating to the more expensive one).
99
See MeasuringEffectiveness and Cost Effectiveness: The QALY, NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH
&

CLINICAL

EXCELLENCE,

http://www.nice.org.uk/newsroom/features/measuring

effectivenessandcosteffectivenesstheqalyjsp (last updated Apr. 20, 2010).
100 Seth A. Seabury et al., Patients Value Metastatic Cancer Therapy More Highly than Is
Typically Shown Through TraditionalEstimates, 31 HEALTH Ave. 691, 691 (2012).
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the QALY method, which relies on healthy people to determine the
quality of life of those who are disabled or ill. 10 1
Third, the insurer "stands to profit from not paying claims," a
conflict of interest with the patient's health.10 2 Still, insurers seek to
maintain a reputation for paying claims. 0 3 "[I]nsurers are acutely
aware that a well-publicized dispute over an inappropriately denied
claim might cause them to lose the next renewal of their contract."1 0 4
Public insurers face similar constraints because "we regard health insurance as a life raft for those in peril instead of a common-pool resource requiring stewardship. We reach desperately for any new
technology that might help defeat death. Any preplanned limit seems
like a death panel."1 0 5 Commentators have long concluded that it is
"highly unlikely that the American population would support the rationing of expensive high technology in the fashion characterizing England's National Health Service." 10 6
Recognizing these problems, the law limits insurer rationing. Insurers face the threat of litigation when they deny coverage, and
courts interpret insurer contracts in favor of the patient where ambiguous. 10 7 Traditionally, courts deferred to physician, rather than insurer, assessment of medical necessity.10 8 "Courts continually fail to
see beyond the heart-rending facts of the immediate case to the reality
that the present strained ruling in favor of coverage will be applied by
101 Gina Kolata, Ethicists Struggle to judge the 'Value' of Lye, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at
CS.
102 See Hall & Anderson, supra note 19, at 1668. Mark Hall and Gerard Anderson explain, however, that the interests of insurer and insured may align where the insurer
merely manages benefits for a self-insured employer. See id. See generallyJAY M. FEINMAN,
DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIEs DON'T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN
Do ABoUT IT (2010) (discussing insurers' tactics of delaying or denyingjustified claims and
forcing policyholders to litigate).
10
See Hall & Anderson, supra note 19, at 1672.
104
105

Id.

106

DAVID

Sage, supra note 66, at 1510; see also Peter J. Neumann et al., Medicare and CostEffectiveness Analysis, 353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1516, 1519 (2005) (discussing similar reasons
for American distrust of a cost-effectiveness analysis for Medicare).
MEcHANIc,

FROM ADvocAcy

To ALLocATION:

THE

EvoLVING AMERICAN

HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 215 (1986).

107 See Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 365 N.E.2d 638, 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Mello
& Brennan, supra note 33, at 107-10 (discussing the litigation against insurers over HDCABMT, including a $77 million punitive damages judgment).
108 See David D. Griner, Paying the Piper: Third-Party PayorLiability for Medical Treatment
Decisions, 25 GA. L. REV. 861, 861-62 (1991) ("For nearly a century, it has been the 'settled
rule' that it is impossible for anyone to exercise control over the medical acts of physi-

cians."); see also Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of N.J., Civ. A. No. 90-597, 1990 WL
312647, at *1, *3, *9 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990) (enjoining insurer from denying coverage for
HDC-AMBT, which it deemed "investigational or experimental," despite consensus that it
was necessary to save the patient's life); Van Vactor, 365 N.E.2d at 645-46 (affirming the
trial court's denial of defendant insurer's motion for summary judgment based on affidavits of doctors and patients stating that the procedure was medically necessary).
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other courts even if the contract is revised in the suggested manner." 0 9 When patients challenge insurers' cost-effectiveness coverage
decisions, the insurers "consistently lose in court." 10
State and federal governments have imposed over two thousand
mandates on insurance providers, requiring them to cover particular
treatments."' Thirty-six of these mandates require coverage of offlabel drugs in particular, precisely those that often have unproven efficacy." 2 Most states also allow patients who have been denied coverage based on medical necessity to appeal to an independent
physician." 3 Such "external review" policies remove ultimate power
from the hands of the insurer.1 1 4
For public insurers, the law further constrains their use of costeffectiveness analyses to refuse coverage. As a part of the landmark
health care reforms, Congress established an Independent Payment
Advisory Board (IPAB), which will eventually have broad powers to
reduce the cost of health care."" It was thought necessary to create
an independent agency for this purpose because political forces had
repeatedly prevented Congress from doing so itself. Peter Orszag has
called IPAB "the largest yielding of sovereignty from the Congress
since the creation of the Federal Reserve." 1 6 Still, even in this moment of possibility, Congress did not permit IPAB to make any policy
reforms that would alter the benefits of Medicare beneficiaries or re-

109
110

1n

Hall & Anderson, supra note 19, at 1657.
Id. at 1660.
See VicTORIA CRAIG BUNCE & J.P. WIESKE,

HEALTH INSURANCE

COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS.,
MANDATES IN THE STATES 2010, at 1 (2010), available at http://

www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/MandatesintheStates20lOExecSummary.pdf
112 See id. at 5. For a discussion of FDA approval as a proxy for proven efficacy, see
supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
113 See Aaron Seth Kesselheim, What's the Appeal? Trying to ControlManaged Care Medical
Necessity Decisionmaking Through a System of External Appeals, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 877
(2001) ("[B]y 1999 thirty states and the District of Columbia had established rights to
external review for private health plan enrollees.").
114 See Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 65 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 55, 93 (2002) ("External review essentially denies health plans any intermediary
role in selecting treatments .... [S]uch regulation drastically curtaills] opportunities for
health plans to . . . achieve consistency in administering ... benefits.").
115 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,

§§ 3403,
10320, 124 Stat. 119, 489-507, 949-952 (2010).
116 Ezra Klein, Can We Control Costs Without Congress?, WASH. PoST (Mar. 26, 2010, 2:46
PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/03/can-wecontrol-costs-with
out_c.html.
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sult in "rationing."' 1 7 Even with these limitations, IPAB has become a
political lightning rod.1 18
This section has shown that the insurer's fiat is an incomplete
solution to the problem of expensive but low-value treatments. The
political, market, and legal limits are too great. Due to these pressures, "insurers have largely abandoned direct attempts to limit coverage for most medical procedures and instead have adopted a passthrough attitude toward medical spending."1 19
C.

The Patient Rationer

In recent years, the idea of consumer-directed health care has
dominated health care reform debates. "Consumers must decide
whether a purchase is worth its price."1 20 The problem is that insurance allows patients to be insensitive to price because patients do not
bear the cost. This problem is known as "moral hazard."
"Cost sharing"-in the form of co-pays, deductibles, coinsurance,
and caps on coverage-is the typical solution. As shown in Figure 2,
this method of cost control splits the cost between the insurer and the
patient, such that the insurance benefit becomes somewhat less than
the cost of the procedure. For example, the patient may be required
to pay a ten-dollar share of the costs to his health care provider, and
the insurer will pay the provider the remainder, say, $500.121

117
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3403(a) (1) (enacting a provision,
to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1899A(c) (2) (A) (ii), stating that proposals by IPAB "shall not
include any recommendation to ration health care"); JACK EBELER ET AL., THE HENRY J.

BOARD: A NEW APPROACH TO
CONTROLLING MEDICARE SPENDING 3 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY

upload/8150.pdf.
S18 See, e.g., Jason Kane, Medicare Coverage of Pricey CancerDrugs Sparks 'Rationing'Debate,
PBS (July 5, 2011, 3:27 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/07/priceycancer-drugs-spark-rationing-debate.html (describing the controversy following Medicare
officials' decision to continue to pay for expensive cancer treatments of questionable
effectiveness).
119

Mark A. Hall, State Regulation of Medical Necessity: The Case of Weight-Reduction Surgery,

53 DuKE L.J. 653, 655 (2003).
120
Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the
New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICi. L. REV. 643, 659 (2008).
121
See generally How to Spend Less on Copays and Coinsurancer,MEDICARE.COM, http://

www.medicare.com/medigap-insurance/how-to-spend-less-on-copays.html (last visited Feb.
16, 2013) (discussing the Medicare co-payment process).
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2:

COST-SHARING STRATEGY

Patient's Cost
Share

Insurance
Benefit

Cost sharing reduces insurance outlays in two ways. First, it
reduces the burden on the insurer for each treatment consumed.
Second, and more importantly, the cost share may reduce consumption by causing the patient to weigh that portion of the cost against
the potential benefits of the procedure. 122 A rational patient will view
the co-pay as an opportunity cost and consider whether she would prefer to spend her money on something other than treatment. Thus, a
cost share partially aligns the interests of the insurer and the insured
by causing the patient to internalize some of the cost of the treatment.
The well-known 1970s RAND Health Insurance Experiment
demonstrated that cost sharing can decrease health care consumption.12 3 In one condition, patients were required to make 95% copays and in another, they received full insurance. The latter was associated with a 45% increase in per capita spending.1 2 4 Further, however, the RAND study "also found that people consume less necessary
healthcare to the same extent as they consume less unnecessary
healthcare, and that poorer people with chronic diseases suffered
poorer health when faced with high cost sharing."1 2 5 These adverse
effects were noted even though the RAND study limited patients' exposure to cost to $1,000 per year, 12 6 far short of the cost necessary to
122 See Chernew et al., supra note 25, at w196 ("The motivation behind the use of cost
sharing to allocate medical services and contain costs follows standard economic theory,
which presumes that consumers will use only those services whose benefit exceeds the cost
to them.").
123
SeeJOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & THE INS. EXPERIMENT GR., FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM
THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 338-39 (1993).

The RAND study found that

cost sharing had no adverse impact on mortality for the average person, but did for elevated-risk and low-income persons. See id. at 208-11.
124

Id. at 40.

125 Jost, supra note 2, at 584; see also M. Gregg Bloche, Consumer-DirectedHealth Care and
the Disadvantaged,26 HEALTH Ave. 1315, 1318 (2007) (describing the RAND experiment's
finding "that high cost sharing reduced use of appropriate and inappropriate care in indiscriminate fashion").
126
See NEWHOUSE & THE INS. EXPERIMENT GRP., supra note 123, at 40.
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have a sizeable impact on the highly expensive procedures that are
the focus here.
Scholars have documented cost-sharing obligations imposing onerous burdens on patients. For example, insured patients who have
cost concerns delay seeking emergency care for heart attacks. 2 7 Cancer patients do not fill prescriptions or take full doses of the prescriptions they did fill so as to preserve funds for cost-sharing obligations
on other treatments. 2 8 Children with chronic health conditions
forgo prescribed care.' 2 9
Scholars refer to this problem-where the insurance benefit is
too small in proportion to the cost of care-as "underinsurance." 30
If patients decline care because the co-pay is just too high given their
wealth, then the cost-sharing policy mechanism no longer achieves its
purpose of sorting high-value care from low-value care. 3 1 Instead,
the mechanism simply rations by wealth, which is to say that it discriminates against the poor.
It is not merely that cost-sharing obligations are large and can
accumulate quickly. It is a pernicious cycle because illness and injury
are often correlated with a loss of income, which further exacerbates
the problem.' 3 2 It is difficult to earn money to pay cost-sharing obligations when one is severely ill or when one must care for a sick child
or elderly parent. The cost-sharing tactic imposes financial burdens
on patients at a time when they may be least able to pay them.
Cost sharing also imposes negative externalities. Health care expenses lead to millions of bankruptcies and foreclosures, which impact other members of the family, other creditors, and
neighborhoods.1 3 3 Americans are already paying 15% to 22% of their

127 See Kim G. Smolderen et al., Health Care Insurance, FinancialConcerns in Accessing
Care, and Delays to Hospital Presentation in Acute Myocardial Infarction, 303 JAMA 1392,
1397-99 (2010).
128
See Yousuf Zafar et al., Impact of Out-of-Pocket Expenses on Cancer Care, 29 J. CLINICAL
ONCoLoGY abstr. 6006 (Supp. 2011).
129
See Michael D. Kogan et al., Association Between Underinsurance and Access to Care
Among Children with Special Health Care Needs in the United States, 116 PEDIATRICS 1162,
1162-63 (2005).
130
See Cathy Schoen et al., How Many Are Underinsured?Trends Among US. Adults, 2003
and 2007, 27 HEALTH AFF. w298, w299 (2008) (classifying persons as "underinsured" if they
experience "at least one of three indicators of financial exposure relative to income").
131
SeeJoHN A. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE 144-51 (2003)
(arguing that the imposition of cost sharing may harm aggregate welfare because it
reduces access to both effective and ineffective care).
132
See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHwr: THE NEw ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 137-43 (rev. & exp. ed. 2008) (discussing
the economic insecurity that Americans face due to health care problems).
133
See sources cited supra note 4.
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family income on health care, making further cost shifting toward patients unfeasible.134
Recognizing that cost sharing is impractical when costs are high
in proportion to patient wealth, many public health insurance programs have minimal or no cost-sharing obligations. The beneficiaries
of these programs are already destitute since that is the precondition
for the public health insurance coverage. 3 5 More broadly, insurance
plans often cap co-pays and deductibles by annual limits, beyond
which the patient pays nothing out-of-pocket. "Roughly 77% of fulltime employees of medium and large establishments enrolled in nonHMO plans have maximum out-of-pocket limits less than US$2000 per
individual and the most common coinsurance rate is 20%. Thus, individuals with more than US$10,000 in total costs will face no cost sharing at the margin."13 6 As Timothy Jost explains, "Once consumers
reach the limits of the deductible, they have little reason to limit their
consumption of health care or to pay attention to its price." 3 7
Recent federal policy efforts have sought to increase these levels
to about $6,000 for an individual, in conjunction with incentives for
patients to save money in "health savings accounts." 3 8 Even assuming
that a patient does have enough money set aside to then reach these
higher limits, tests, office visits, and other treatments may quickly exhaust the higher limit, still long before a physician prescribes the patient an expensive treatment. And lawmakers in twenty states have
introduced bills to prevent insurers from imposing higher co-pay obligations out of concern that big cost shares put expensive drugs out of
reach.139 Such high cost-sharing levels can undermine the purpose of
insurance: guaranteed access to desired care.14 0
134 See Patricia Ketsche et al., Lower-Income Families Pay a Higher Share of Income Toward
National Health Care Spending than Higher-Income Families Do, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1637, 1640
(2011).
135 See, e.g., Amy Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health InsuranceExperiment: Evidencefrom
the First Year 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17190, 2011), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17190.pdfnew-window=1 (explaining that Oregon's expanded Medicaid program does not include a cost-sharing obligation).
136 Michael E. Chernew et al., Optimal Health Insurance: The Case of Observable, Severe
Illness, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 585, 588 (2000) (citation omitted).
137 Jost, supra note 2, at 587.
138
See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION
969: HEALTH SAVINGs ACCOUNTS AND OTHER TAX-FAVORED HEALTH PLANs 3 (2011), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p969.pdf (noting the "high deductible" health plans
that are eligible for use in conjunction with health savings accounts, which are capped at
$5,950 per individual and $11,900 per family).
139 See Andrew Pollack, States Seek Curb on Patient Bills for Costly Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, April
13, 2012, at Al.
140

See Romley et al., supra note 61, at 683 ("Given the value that people assign to

generous coverage of specialty drugs, having high cost sharing on these drugs seemingly

runs contrary to what people value in their health insurance.").
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Moreover, many patients have purchased supplemental insurance
that covers the co-pay, thus preventing the patient from incurring any
of the cost at all. That is the purpose of the extremely popular "MediGap" policies used by Medicare enrollees. 14 1 "Catastrophic coverage"
policies have a similar function of eliminating the patient's exposure
to cost beyond a threshold.142
Thus, cost sharing is not a real solution where the cost of the
treatment is large. In a world where the median annual income is
$50,00014s and a treatment can cost twice that, cost sharing simply
cannot be our complete solution to the problem of high-cost but lowvalue treatments.
A more radical and crude notion of cost sharing has emerged in
recent months-the Medicare voucher idea. Former Tennessee Governor Phil Bredesen and Republican House Budget Chair Paul Ryan
have separately proposed to "[g) ive all Americans annual vouchers for
a certain dollar amount of health care and if they exceed [the value of
the voucher], they are on their own."' 4 4 This proposal is a radical
form of cost sharing because beyond the amount of the voucher, patients bear 100% of the cost for their care (if they can afford any
care).1 45 This proposal is crude because it severely hampers patients'
access to necessary care, regardless of whether the care is cost-effective
or efficient, and it fails to provide any insurance against the risk of
needing higher-cost care.
II
THE SPLIT BENEFIT

This Essay presents an alternative mechanism for achieving a
more rational expenditure of health insurance money in the set of
cases where the physician prescribes a high-cost treatment that the
insurer reasonably believes is inefficient. This mechanism seeks to
141
Of Medicare beneficiaries, 89 percent had some form of supplemental health insurance policies in 2006. JULIETrE CUBANSKI ET AL., THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
EXAMINING SOURCES OF COVERAGE AMONG MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE, AND PRESCRITON DRUG COVERAGE 5 (2008), available at http:/

/www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7801.pdf.
142
See Chernew et al., supra note 136, at 602 ("Catastrophic plans provide full coverage
exactly when it should not exist (at the margin) and provide partial coverage precisely
when cost sharing provides no benefit (at expenditures below the cost of the least expensive, medically appropriate treatment alternative).").
143 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 6 (2012), available at http://
www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf.
144
Larson, supra note 8, at 19-20.
145
See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, For Medicare, We Must Cut Costs, Not Shift Them, N.Y. TIMES

(Dec. 19, 2011, 9:15 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/formedicare-we-must-cut-costs-not-shift-them (discussing voucher programs as an alternative
to Medicare).
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avoid the foregoing problems of co-pays and deductibles (which often
must be too small to work) and insurers' refusals to cover (which
tread on physician expertise, patient autonomy, and feasibility).
A.

The Concept

Currently, insurers do not pay health insurance benefits to the
beneficiary. Instead, insurance is an in-kind benefit paid to the provider on behalf of the patient.
The benefit does create an option for patients to consume care
that might otherwise be unaffordable. That is the function and value
of insurance.1 4 6 But if a patient chooses to decline care for whatever
reason, the insurance benefit disappears. The nonfungible benefit
weighs only on one side of the rational patient's ledger, subsidizing
the consumption of more, and more expensive, health care. 147 Thus,
we should not be surprised to find that health care continuously grows
to consume a larger share of our economy.
Instead of asking patients whether the health care consumption is
better than nothing, we should ask patients if health consumption is
better than whatever else they may prefer. As Figure 3 shows, the potential reform is simple:
1. Pay a small but substantial part of the insurance benefit as cash
directly to the patient-beneficiary.
2. If the patient chooses to proceed with the treatment, the patient takes the cash payment to the provider (along with any
required cost-share obligation), and the insurer matches it with
the balance of the insurance benefit.
Thus, the total size of the insurance benefit is unchanged.

146
See generally NvsoN, supra note 131, at 136-41 (discussing some reasons why consumers do or do not purchase health insurance).
147
This problem of nonfungibility exists even for health savings accounts, which provide tax advantages for contributions and are designed to give patients skin in the game.
These accounts limit spending from the account to health-related expenses, in order to
preserve the tax advantages. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 138, at 3 ("Distributions may be tax free if you pay qualified medical expenses.").
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3:

THE SPLIT BENEFIT MODEL

Cash Benefit

Cost Share
In-Kind Benefit
(conditional)

(if any)

As such, the patient would receive both a cash benefit (the payment he or she receives) and an in-kind benefit (the payment to the
provider), while still perhaps remaining exposed to some portion of
the cost out-of-pocket. For patients that choose to spend the money
in ways other than the treatment, the insurer saves the remainder of
the cost of the procedure. For example, for each patient who would
have taken Avastin under the status quo but declines upon receiving a
$10,000 split benefit, the insurer saves $70,000. Although the size of
the insurance benefit remains unchanged, the split benefit's rerouting of the flow of funds could alter patients' consumption decisions.
Such a payment gives the patient additional options for using his or
her insurance benefit, viz: an opportunity cost.
Patients who receive a split benefit may choose to proceed with
the treatment or choose to promote health in some other way, such as
consuming some other treatment not covered by the insurer (e.g., acupuncture, an alternative diet regimen, a concierge doctor, or visiting
nursing services), paying money to a member of the family to stay
home and provide care to the dying patient, or purchasing disability
insurance to help cope with the symptoms of the illness. Or patients
may use the money to serve other nonmedical values, such as enhancing housing, consuming more of some luxury good, paying off other
debts that are causing disutility, paying for education (for themselves
or others), contributing to a charity, or whatever else may appeal to
the patient.
Logistically, the insurer would require the physician who recommends the expensive treatment to immediately notify the insurer. Insurers often already require physicians to submit plans for expensive
treatments to the insurer for preauthorization. The insurer would
then decide whether to pay a split benefit and, if so, deliver the split
benefit payment to the patient rather quickly (within a day or two) so
as to impact the patient's decision without causing undue delay. Insurers should not send merely a letter that offers a payment condi-
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tional on the patient declining care. Instead, an actual payment in
advance will create a default choice and an endowment effect that
should further reduce consumption.1 4 8
The split benefit avoids the problems that traditional cost-sharing
policies stumble over. Most importantly, it solves the wealth effectthe split benefit allows the cost-share proportion to grow with the cost
of the procedure without being financially onerous on the patient.
Other mechanisms of consumer-driven health care try to give patients
"skin in the game" by increasing patients' deductibles and then hoping
that patients will then have the wealth to compensate.' 4 9 Such hopes
often turn out to be false. The split benefit increases the patient's
share to a substantial portion of the cost, but only by also increasing
the patient's wealth by an equivalent amount. As a result, we can be
confident that patients will select care when it has the highest value.
Unlike a traditional cost-sharing obligation, the split benefit will not
drive patients into bankruptcy or foreclosure.
The split benefit may also be politically feasible. Unlike increased
cost sharing and rationing by insurers and physicians, the proposal
does not constrain access to care or infringe on patient choice. The
coverage and size of the insurance benefit remains unchanged. The
patient makes the ultimate decision about whether to consume.
Nonetheless, the split benefit may reduce health care spending and in
turn make broad health insurance coverage sustainable.
B.

The Insurer's Option

Private insurers could begin paying split benefits immediately,
without changing their contracts. No patient could plausibly complain that she received a cash benefit rather than an in-kind benefit
when her access to the given treatment remains unchanged.
Public insurance programs may require minor changes to the law
to rectify situations where the authorizing statute has unnecessarily
assumed that insurers would pay benefits to providers rather than beneficiaries.15 0 Since the patient makes the ultimate consumption deci148

q

RICHARD H.

THALER

&

CAss R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DEcisIoNs ABOUT

HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESs 207-14 (rev. & exp. ed. 2009) (discussing another situa-

tion-waiving the right to sue for malpractice-where patients may choose reduced rights
in exchange for an economic benefit).
149 See Bloche, supra note 125, at 1319 ("Moreover, the least well-off are the least able
to contribute to HSAs, and their lower marginal tax rates makes doing so less attractive. . . . [L]owwage workers are less likely than others to receive generous employmentbased coverage, including substantial contributions toward their HSAs.").
150 The Medicare statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (2006), is titled "Free choice by patient
guaranteed" and provides that "[any individual entitled to insurance benefits under this
subchapter may obtain health services from any institution, agency, or person qualified to
participate under this subchapter if such institution, agency, or person undertakes to provide him such services." Thus, the statute already contemplates that patients should be the
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sion, the split benefit does not "ration care" within the meaning of
federal law.1 51 Similarly, since the split benefit covers the same benefits, just in a different way, the proposal does not interfere with state
or federal laws that mandate minimum coverage of certain
procedures.' 5 2
This feature of the split benefit proposal-that the health care
industry can implement it immediately without a contentious political
or legal battle-is a very significant advantage of the proposal over
other ideas that may be worthwhile in theory, but stand much further
from practicability. This feature also allows the insurer to view the
split benefit as a unilateral option that it can deploy only when it is
most likely to work. Insurers will find the split benefit most useful for
procedures (whether drugs, devices, surgeries, or diagnostics) that
meet four criteria: (1) the insurer must cover the procedure, (2) the
procedure has not been proven to reduce health care expenditures
on net, (3) the price of the procedure is disproportionate compared
to the patient's wealth, and (4) the patient would otherwise be likely
to consume the treatment. Consider each in turn.
First, for procedures that physicians already refuse to prescribe or
which insurers already exclude, there is no benefit to split. 5 3 Altogether declining coverage is cheaper than covering a procedure
through split benefit. An insurer might also use a fail-first policy to
condition coverage on patients first trying cheaper and proven treatments, or getting a second opinion from an independent physician.
The split benefit presumes that there will nonetheless be a sizeable
domain of expensive treatments that remain covered by insurers.
The second criterion recognizes that a few health care expenditures, such as vaccines, are actually investments, such that spending on
them will reduce future health care costs on net.15 4 A rational insurer
ones making decisions about whether and from whom to consume care. Nonetheless,
many other parts of the U.S. Code currently contemplate payments directly to hospitals,
which Congress may need to revise to allow for split benefit payments. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww ("Payments to hospitals for inpatient hospital services.").
151 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3403(a)(1),
124 Stat. 119, 490 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1899A(c) (2)(A)(ii)) ("The proposal shall not include any recommendation to ration health care, raise revenues . . . increase
Medicare beneficiary cost-sharing . . . or otherwise restrict benefits or modify eligibility
criteria.").
152 See BUNCE & WIESKE, supra note 111, at 1.
153 See supra Parts LA, .B (discussing those procedures which are already refused by
physicians and insurers in the context of "rationing" by physicians and insurers,
respectively).
154 Cf Chernew et al., supra note 25, at w201 ("Offsetting the direct costs are the savings due to the improved health generated by the extra service use. For example, the
direct costs of lower copayments for cholesterol-lowering medication would be offset, at
least partially, by savings attributable to fewer heart attacks.").
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would not utilize the split benefit where it wants to encourage, rather
than discourage, consumption.
Even with this limitation, the split benefit proposal covers a broad
swath of American health care. A 2006 study found that 21 percent of
all prescriptions written in the United States are for off-label uses and
that most of these had "little or no scientific support." 15 5 More
broadly, "[al]though estimates vary, some experts believe that less
than half of all medical care is based on or supported by adequate
evidence about its effectiveness."' 56 Even proof of effectiveness is far
from proof that the treatment will save health care dollars on net
since many expensive treatments have quite modest benefits. Hence,
we can expect insurers to find a large domain that is ripe for the split
benefit.
Although the split benefit could be utilized for any health care
that is costly on net, individual insurers may select a narrower criterion. Public insurers, in particular, may succumb to political pressure
from the providers of expensive health care treatments that would
prefer that their goods and services not be subject to even this modest
market-based scrutiny as to whether their product is worth the prices
charged. Such an insurer could respond by narrowing the program to
target drugs and devices that have unproven efficacy, especially those
prescribed "off-label." This narrower scope would neutralize any paternalistic argument on behalf of patients and would incentivize drug
manufacturers to prove the efficacy of their drugs. A narrowed domain for the split benefit may be better than no domain.
Insurers may, on the other hand, use the split benefit too often,
given the mobility of patients between insurers during their lifespan
and, in particular, the movement into Medicare for seniors. Since insurers will not themselves always reap the benefits of investments in
health care spending that only pay off in the long term, they may use
the split benefit to reduce consumption of some marginal treatments
whose benefits a future insurer would have been borne. This is one
reason that the Affordable Care Act mandated coverage of certain
preventative care services that are socially optimal even if not rational
investments for a single insurer.
Third, the split benefit will be most useful in those situations
where a patient's limited wealth makes it impractical to impose on
that patient a significant portion of the cost of a procedure. For
wealthy patients or cheap procedures, the proposal is unmotivated,
155

David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166

ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1021 (2006).
156
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL
TREATMENTS, supra note 26, at 11.
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since traditional cost-sharing mechanisms are cheaper to the insurer
and may sufficiently deter overuse without reducing access.
This relationship is shown in Figure 4. The zone in which cost
sharing is now used effectively has a relatively low limit for costly treatments because a patient's maximum cost share for individual procedures is often a few hundred dollars, while his or her maximum
aggregate cost share over a year is a few thousand dollars.1 57
FIGURE 4:
OPPORTUNITY SPACE FOR SPLIT BENEFIT VERSUS COST SHARING AS A
FUNCTION OF COST OF TREATMENT AND PATIENT WEALTH

B

potential
cost

zone for

of

split-benefit

treatment

A
patient's wealth
As shown in Figure 4, a state Medicaid program that caps coverage eligibility at the federal poverty level may be unable to impose
cost-sharing obligations at all and thus could use the split benefit even
for inexpensive treatments.

Point B depicts the situation of the employer-sponsored health
insurer for a company like Google, which has one of the highest-paid
workforces in the world. 15 8 Although Google could impose higher
cost-sharing limits for its richer employees (making that zone triangular rather than rectangular), insurers in fact tend to impose the same
157 See Romley et al., supra note 61, at 684 (identifying the ninety-fifth percentile of the
patient cost-sharing scale at about $167 per month for the average user, as measured in
2010 dollars).
158 See Matt Lynley, The 25 Highest-PayingTech Companies, Bus. INSIDER (July 12, 2012,
12:17 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-25-highest-paying-companies-intechnology-2012-7?op=1.
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cost-sharing obligations on the richest and poorest employees alike.
This lack of sensitivity may exist because it is unseemly or impractical
to discriminate based on patient wealth. Regardless, it creates an even
larger potential for the split benefit.
Suppose that a drug that costs more than $12,000 for a course of
treatment would be a good candidate for the split benefit, since a
traditional cost-share obligation would need to be capped for median
Americans long before it covered a substantial portion of the cost.
The split benefit will still cover a huge portion of health care costs.
Recall that in 2009, 1% of the population consumed 21.8% of aggregate health care costs; each individual in this 1% incurred more than
$90,000 in costs in that year. 15 9 Although this proposal omits all sorts
of lower-cost health care for middle income Americans-the cast on a
broken bone or the migraine medicine-this proposal targets the
rampant problem of expensive care that drives up health care costs
and insurance premiums.
The insurer also has the discretion to select what level of split is
optimal for each patient. The optimal size of the split benefit payment is an empirical question, one that is likely context-dependent.
There will presumably be diminishing marginal returns, such that
moving from a 1% to a 10% split may yield a very large reduction in
the rate of consumption, but the equally costly step of moving from a
10% split to a 19% split may yield little additional benefit.1 60 Patients
may view a $1,000 payment much differently than a $10,000 payment
if the first just seems like a supplement to income while the latter
creates real opportunities.' 6 '
Fourth, the rational insurer will elect to pay a split benefit payment where the patient is most likely to consume the treatment otherwise. The insurer will decline to make a split benefit payment in cases
where it suspects that patients may be seeking, and physicians may be
providing, treatment recommendations merely for the sake of garnering a cash payout.
Given that the information necessary to make such predictions
will be costly and imprecise, one can assume that split benefit payments will be made to some patients wastefully. We can roughly esti159

See Cohen & Yu, supra note 62, at 1.
160 See Craig R. Fox & Russell A. Poldrack, Prospect Theory and the Brain, in
NEUROECONOMICS: DECISION MNG AND THE BRAIN 145, 146 (Paul W. Glimcher et al. eds.,

2009).
161
See Claudia R. Sahm et al., Check in the Mail or More in the Paycheck: Does the Effectiveness ofFiscal Stimulus Depend on How It Is Delivered?4-5 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Fed.

Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2010-40, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1895524 (discussing the "mental accounting" framework of Richard Thaler and
Cass Sunstein, and predictions of James Suroweicki).
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mate whether over inclusiveness will be fatal to the split benefit
proposal, such that rational insurers will never exercise their option.
As shown in Table 1, there will be three types of patients whose
16 2 First are the
behaviors will be of interest to the rational insurer.
"decliners"-those who would have received a prescription and consumed under the status quo, but upon receiving the split benefit decline to consume. In the foregoing Avastin example, we supposed
that selected patients might each receive a $10,000 payment toward an
$80,000 treatment. For each decliner, the insurer saves the difference
between the insurance benefit and the split-here, $70,000. Second,
the "riders" are those who receive split benefit payments but would
not have consumed the treatment under the status quo anyway. For
the riders, the split benefit is a windfall. Compared to the status quo,
the insurer loses the amount of the split-here, $10,000. Finally there
are the "seekers," who succeed in getting a prescription only for the
purpose of getting a split benefit check, which they promptly cash.
These patients also cost $10,000 each.
TABLE 1:
SCHEMATIC OF BEHAVIORS UNDER STATUS QUO AND SPLIT BENEFIT
(Assuming $80,000 Insurance Benefit and

$10,000 Split Benefit Payment)
DECLINERS

RIDERS

SEEKERS

STATUS QUO

Prescribed?
Consumed?

Yes
Yes

Yes
No

No
No

SPLIT BENEFIT

Prescribed?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Consumed?

No

No

No

Saves $70,000

Costs $10,000

Costs $10,000

Net Outcome

Roughly then, we can observe that the split benefit has a relatively
high tolerance for riders and seekers, which one can group together.
Even if there are six times as many riders and seekers as there are
decliners, the split benefit is likely to save money on net.
Interestingly, the split benefit potentially saves money for the insurer even while providing a windfall to those innocent riders who are
genuinely sick and probably could use the money, given that illness
162 This analysis excludes the patients who will consume under either the status quo or
the split benefit, since they have no impact on cost (other than the nominal administrative
expense of paying a split benefit, if that turned out to be higher than paying the provider
in kind). In theory, there could be yet another type of patient who would have received a
prescription under the status quo, and declined to consume, but the split benefit payment
somehow caused the patient to consume the treatment.
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and injury are also associated with loss of income.16 3 The overinclusiveness of the split benefit may enhance social welfare incidentally.
Of course, the particular ratio depicted in Table 1 is peculiar to
the Avastin example and its postulated values. It may be possible that
an insurer could produce a significant number of decliners by paying
only a $5,000 split, rather than a $10,000 split. That would then
double its tolerance for riders and seekers. On the other hand, if the
split benefit is applied to other drugs that are less expensive, say
$40,000, but it is still necessary to pay $10,000 splits to get a significant
number of decliners, then the tolerance for riders and seekers will be
smaller. In that scenario, there is more of a risk that the split benefit
will lose money on net.
One form of riding and seeking behavior would arise in contexts
where there are multiple potential treatment alternatives. A patient
could seek prescriptions for several different treatments in hopes of
getting a split benefit payment, but then consume only one. Foreseeing this possibility, the rational insurer would pay a split benefit payment to the patient after the first such prescription, but tell the
patient that she must pay the provider if she elects to pursue any of
the courses of treatments that the insurer wishes to discourage. If
clinical studies have proved some of the potential treatments more
efficient than others, the insurer could have a tiered pricelist, just as
they currently do with cost-sharing tiers, to discourage consumption
of brand name drugs when generics are available.
In deciding whether to pay a split benefit, the insurer will analyze
its claims data to observe that some diagnoses, procedures, physicians,
and patients may have better yield rates than others. If a particular
physician very frequently prescribes treatments that appear to be costineffective but very few patients are actually electing the treatment
over the cash payment, then the ratio can be lowered or that physician's patients can be excluded from eligibility for split payments.
Clearly, the split benefit should not be paid for ailments that are
easy to fake or where the diagnosis is most subjective. For example,
nonspecific back pain may be one such diagnosis that could be opportunistic for a higher percentage of patients than other diagnoses, such
as breast cancer.1 64
In extreme cases, physicians and patients may commit outright
fraud, providing sham diagnoses in order to secure an outlay from the
163

See generally HACKER, supra note 132, at 138 ("Among insuredAmericans, 51 million

spend more than 10 percent of their income on medical care.").
164 Even under the status quo, there are concerns about patients faking such diagnoses
in order to procure prescriptions for narcotics. See Andrew D. Zechnich & Jerris R.
Hedges, Community-Wide Emergency Department Visits by Patients SuspectedofDrugSeekingBehav-

ior, 3 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 312 (1996). For recognition that "each illness has a different
moral hazard profile," see NMANa, supra note 131, at 154.
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insurer for a procedure that was never truly indicated, or if indicated,
not desired. These risks already exist to the extent that physicians can
bill the insurer for procedures that they do not perform or that they
perform even when not medically indicated.16 5 An agreement between patient and physician to split the cash payment would seem to
be a per se violation. Enforcement of the criminal prohibitions on
health care fraud will be part of the solution just as it is now.
The foregoing analysis suggests that there is a wide domain of
potential for rational insurers to exercise the option to pay a split benefit to satisfy their coverage obligations, rather than providing an inkind nonfungible benefit as they currently do. Because the split benefit complies with current law and contracts, it creates a unilateral option that insurers can use to reduce inefficient health care
consumption.
C.

The Precedents

Research has failed to uncover a prior split benefit proposal in
the scholarly and policy literature.16 6 There are, however, various interesting analogues and precedents.
In the life insurance sector, there has been a practice of people
exchanging their future life insurance benefit for a payment to be
received during life, called a "viatical." 67 In this way, the life insurance benefit is made more fungible, better reflecting the consumption preferences of the policyholders.
Scholars have also previously noted the problem that health insurance is a nonfungible benefit.1 6 8 Some have suggested an "indemnity" system where health insurers pay a cash benefit to patients rather
than to providers.' 6 9 Some automobile collision insurers likewise al165
See generallyJoan H. Krause, Skilling and the Pursuitof HealthcareFraud,66 U. MIAu
L. REv. 363, 365-68 (2012) (discussing concerns about physicians committing health care
fraud).
166 John Nyman has suggested a related concept as a thought experiment. See NYMAN,
supra note 131, at 40-41 (describing "the consumer's income payoff test" as defining the
cost-effectiveness of care, predicated on the idea that the patient be given the insurance as
a fungible benefit "that she could have spent on anything else" (emphasis omitted)).
167
See VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL Act (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 2009), reprinted
in NAT'L Ass'N OF INs. Comm'Rs, 5 MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 697-1, 697-1

to -40 (2012); see alsoJessica Maria Perez, Note, You Can Bet Your Life on It! Regulating Senior

Settlements to Be a FinancialAlternative for the Elderly, 10

ELDER

L.J. 425, 428 (2002) (discuss-

ing the mechanics of a typical viatical settlement transaction).
168
See, e.g., Barry S. Coller, Commentary, Realigning Incentives to Achieve Health Care

Reform, 306 JAMA 204, 204 (2011) ("The current health care system does not derive the
benefit of market forces because the recipient of the services (the patient) does not directly pay the physician or hospital. Instead, a third party (the insurer) pays, and a fourth
party (the employer) often chooses the third party.").
169
See Frank D Gianfrancesco, A Proposalfor Improving the Efficiency of Medical Insurance,
2 J. HEALTH ECON. 176, 176 (1983); Robert F. Graboyes, Our Money or Your Life: Indemnities
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low car owners to decide whether, when, and how to repair their carand, notably, to keep any balance that they decline to spend.17 0
In the health insurance context, a 100% cash payment of the insurance benefit would more dramatically correct the distortion of
nonfungible health insurance. Such a system would likely slow, or
even reverse, the growth of health spending as a portion of our economy, as people choose higher-value options. However, a pure indemnity would not save money for the insurer or reduce insurance
premiums for the employers and patients ex ante. Suppose that each
Avastin prescription would invoke a full payment of the $80,000 insurance benefit to the patient rather than the provider. Patients would
consume less Avastin if they valued other things more, but insurers
would spend just as much money. Indeed, a pure indemnity would
likely increase net costs because it would pay benefits to riders and
seekers, who would not have consumed anyway. Even now, some patients receive prescriptions but do not consume the care, and under a
pure indemnity, more patients would seek prescriptions that they
could convert to cash. Unlike the split benefit, a pure indemnity proposal has no savings to offset this risk of over inclusiveness.
Of course, a pure indemnity proposal could save money if it also
reduced the size of the insurance benefit.1 7 ' That is, however, just
another form of cost sharing, with all its problems. Instead, this Essay
proposes to split the benefit in a way that reduces costs for public and
private insurers, making health care insurance more sustainable and
less expensive for the same amount of insurance coverage. Insurance
can provide the same access to care and protection from risk at less
cost.

vs. Deductibles in Health Insurance1-2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working Paper No.

00-04, 2000), available at http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/
working-papers/2000/pdf/wpO-4.pdf.
170
See Susan Feigenbaum, "Body shop"Economics: What's Good for Our Cars May Be Good
for Our Health, in 15 REGULATION: CATO REv. BUs. & GoV'T 25, 27 (1992).
171
See, e.g.,Joseph P. Newhouse & Vincent Taylor, The RAND Corp., A New Approach

to Hospital Insurance 3-4 (Jan. 1969) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P4016.pdf (developing a proposal
for "Variable Cost Insurance," which sets the illness indemnity at a base level, and imposing
100% cost sharing above that level); Mark V. Pauly, Indemnity Insurancefor Health Care Efficiency, 24 ECON. & Bus. BULL. 53, 57 (1971) [hereinafter Pauly, Indemnity Insurance] (ex-

plaining that under such policies "[t]he insured has no protection against the contingency
that his out-of-pocket payments will be very large," and proposing a base-level indemnity
and proportional cost sharing above that level); see also Joseph P. Newhouse & Vincent
Taylor, The Subsidy Problem in Hospital Insurance A Proposal,43 J. Bus. 452, 453-54 (1970)
(arguing that individuals would choose lower cost options if available); Mark V. Pauly, Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical Economy, 24 J. EcoN. LITERATURE
629, 630 (1986) (arguing that "excessively" rising health care costs are tied to the health
insurance scheme).
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There are other indemnity reform proposals that bundle all potential treatments for defined categories of illness, not unlike the system Medicare now uses.17 2 Patients are coded into one of several
thousand "diagnosis related groups" (DRGs), each of which results in
a specified payment that represents the "average" cost of treating the
condition.17 3 The DRG system transfers to the hospital the risk that
within a DRG, a particular patient will get unusually expensive care; in
turn, the hospital tries to spread that risk across its patients. 7 4 Accordingly, the DRG system creates an incentive for hospitals to select
the easiest patients, code patients into the most lucrative DRGs, and
provide the cheapest care within those DRGs.67 5 Other public and
private insurers adopted this DRG payment model, and it now serves
as the norm for inpatient hospital services.' 7 6
Under the DRG system, insurers could make payments to patients, rather than in kind to providers. Under such a system, a patient with a given diagnosis would receive a one-time payment
representing the average amount of care for the diagnosis, and then
the patient can pay the provider on a fee-for-service basis. Insurance
would simply not cover access to care beyond the average level. Unlike a hospital, an individual patient cannot spread the risk that she
will want or need above-average care for her disease. This system cuts
the size of the insurance benefit and thus fails to maintain access.
Alternatively, some scholars have proposed that insurers pay rebates to patients who select less expensive treatments and require a
payment from the patient for the more expensive treatment.17 7 Indeed, some innovative programs have begun where insurers are paying small incentives to patients who choose less expensive health care
providers for the same treatments. 7 8 These are initial steps toward
172
See, e.g., Pauly, Indemnity Insurance, supra note 171, at 55 (proposing "[a] pure indemnity insurance for health-related losses ... which specified a particular dollar payment
for an individual with a given physical condition").
173
See Eleanor D. Kinney, Making Hard Choices Under the Medicare Prospective Payment
System: One Administrative Model for Allocating Medical Resources Under a Government Health
Insurance Program, 19 IND. L. REv. 1151, 1176 (1986). Even in the prospective payment

system, hospitals can sometimes secure additional payments for "outlier" patients that require unusually expensive care. See id. at 1180. See generally RICK MAYES & ROBERT A BERENSON, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE SHAPING OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 70 (2006)

(discussing how hospitals turned to privately insured patients to recoup losses incurred
from Medicare patients).
See Paul A. Taheri et al., How DRGs Hurt Academic Health Systems, 193J. AM. C.
GEONS 1, 1 (2001).
175
See MAYES & BERENSON, supra note 173, at 72-73.
176
See Kinney, supra note 173, at 1151.
174

SUR-

177
See Chernew et al., supra note 136, at 601-02 (suggesting the concept but not "advocating for any particular insurance policy design").
178

KAISER

See Michelle Andrews, Some Insurers Paying Patients Who Agree to Get Cheaper Care,
HEALTH

NEws

(Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Features/
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the fundamental reconceptualization of the insurance benefit proposed herein.
The closest analogue to the split benefit proposal is a German
disability insurance program limited to those needing home care.17 9
The German program offers patients an option to receive an in-kind
benefit consisting of health care workers visiting their homes or a
smaller cash payment instead.1 8 0 Unlike the split benefit, the German
program's cash payments are not designed to give the patient skin in
the game when deciding whether to consume the in-kind services. Instead, the cash payment is the complete alternative benefit, one that a
patient can use to support home care that he or she arranges, perhaps
through family or informal support relationships."s The German patients elect which sort of benefit to receive; there does not appear to
be a default rule. 18 2 The German program suggests that the split benefit payments might lead to a significant reduction in consumption.
Based on data from the 1990s, "more than 75% of home care beneficiaries chose cash rather than services." 8 3
III
PRAcTICiAL AND NORMATIVE CHALLENGES
This Part explores challenges to the split benefit concept, including both a practical challenge by the providers of expensive treatments, and normative challenges-some paternalistic and some
teleological.' 8 4 Ultimately, the split benefit arguably improves patient
autonomy and welfare. But even if the split benefit were neutral on
those points, it would still be worthwhile if only for the sake of cost
control.

Insuring-Your-Health/2012/Cash-Rewards-For-Cheaper-Care-Michelle-Andrews032712.aspx.
179 See Joshua M. Wiener & Alison Evans Cuellar, Public and Private Responsibilities:
Home- and Community-Based Services in the United Kingdom and Germany, 11 J. AGING &
HEALTH 417, 437-38 (1999). In another German program, patients receive insurance premium rebates if they receive no care for a given period. See Peter Zweifel, Premium Rebates
for No Claims: The West German Experience, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: THE POuTICAL ECONOMY OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH INSURANCE 323, 324 (H.E. Frech III ed., 1988).
180 See Wiener & Cuellar, supra note 179, at 437-38 ("For those in the most disabled
category-needing activities of daily living care during the day and night-the cash level is
$750 per month, as opposed to $1,400 in services.").
181

Id. at 439.

182 See id. at 437 ("For home care, the new insurance plan offers a choice: services, cash
equivalent to about half the cost of services, or a combination of the two.").
183

Id. at 438.

I explored other practical challenges, including fraud and over inclusiveness, when
I specified the criteria for paying a split benefit. See supra Part II.B.
184
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Co-optation by Producers

Those who stand to benefit from spending on expensive treatments (the producers and providers of these drugs, devices, and procedures) may attempt to co-opt the split benefit by making side
payments. For example, suppose a patient receives a physician's recommendation for Avastin and a $10,000 split benefit payment from
the insurer. The drug manufacturer, the oncologist, or both could
then send the patient a $10,000 coupon, telling the patient that he or
she can take that, rather than the $10,000 cash, to the oncologist to
initiate treatment. The split benefit proposal would thus fail to reduce consumption.
This objection is not peculiar to the split benefit; drug manufacturers already use such coupon strategies to defeat traditional costsharing strategies, at great cost to insurers.a 5 For patients covered by
federal health insurance programs and for all patients in Massachusetts, such kickbacks are illegal.1 86 Congress could, and likely should,
expand these prohibitions through state or federal legislation.
Insurers can also use their insurance contracts with patients to
prohibit the use of coupons and can condition payments to providers
on assurance that the provider did not accept a coupon. Finally, it
would appear that insurers could use the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to litigate against those who pay coupons, since federal law -elsewhere defines these as kickbacks.1 87
B. Access and Autonomy
If a physician refuses to write a prescription because of cost, if an
insurer refuses to cover such a prescription, or if an onerous cost
share exceeds a patient's ability to pay-the health care system has
denied the patient the choice. In contrast, the split benefit keeps the
decision in the hands of the patient.
As Bill Sage explains, "nearly all progressive impulses among
American health lawyers and policy makers over the past half century
have sought to liberate and empower the patient. Phrases used to express this desire include 'patient autonomy,' 'patients' rights,' 'patient
185 SeeJonathan D. Rockoff, Drug Makers Criticizedfor Co-Pay Subsidies, WALL ST. J., July
20, 2009, at BI; Chanajoffe-Walt, Drug Coupons Hide True Costs from Consumers, NPR (Oct.
20, 2009, 1:05 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?stoyld=113969968.
186
See Visante, How COPAY CoUPoNs COULD RAISE PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS BY $32
BILLION OVER THE NEXT DECADE 3 (2011), available at http://www.masspirg.org/uploads/

bf/95/bf95f22db81052a7acb378a366b73a6c/visante-copay-coupon-study.pdf.
187 See Krause, supra note 165, at 363-64, 388-89; Linda A. Johnson, Consumer Group
Sues 8 Drugmakers over Drug Coupons, USA TODAY (Mar. 7, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/drugs/story/201 2-03-07/drugcoupons-lawsuit/53400686/1.
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self-determination,' [and] 'patient preferences."'18 8 The autonomy
agenda has, however, been cramped because insurance views the patient as merely a patient. He or she gets a walled garden of medical
choices. The split benefit instead embraces a value pluralism, respecting the patient's weighing of medical and nonmedical values.
One might object that the split benefit payment seems coercive
or bribe-like, perhaps an "undue influence."1 8 9 The worry is that the
split benefit payment will unduly push patients away from consuming
health care. To the contrary, the entire insurance relationship on net,
even including a split benefit payment, still induces patients toward
consuming health care. The insurer tells the patient that he or she
can spend the money on anything, but if the patient wants to consume
health care, then the insurer will provide a nine-times subsidy (assuming a ten percent split). Merely allowing the patient to decide how
she wants to spend one-tenth of her insurance benefit does not constitute an "undue influence."' 9
Still, the additional options created by the split benefit may cause
subjective disutility to the patient tasked with deciding.' 9 ' Prior behavioral research documents that, when given more options, people
are sometimes less satisfied.192 On the other hand, there is heterogeneity-some enjoy tasks that require effortful thinking and may savor
the opportunities created by the new wealth.' 9 3
188
Sage, supra note 66, at 1505 (footnotes omitted). Still, Sage worries that "the patient's conquest" will run up costs so much that it "risk[s] the collapse of the health care
system that he or she would dominate." Id. at 1508.
189
Critics have raised a similar concern with regard to payments made to human subjects as compensation for their participation in research. See generally Ari VanderWalde &

Seth Kurzban, Paying Human Subjects in Research: Where Are We, How Did We Get Here, and
Now What?, 39J.L. MED. & ETHics 543, 544 (2011) (reviewing the literature surrounding

these objections). There are good reasons to doubt this entire line of critique. SeeJohn
Lawrence Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 631, 662 (1994) ("An offer of benefits can
never be coercive ......").
190 See Christopher Tarver Robertson, From Free Riders to Fairness:A CooperativeSystem for
Organ Transplantation,48JURIMETRICS 1, 36-38 (2007) (arguing against the idea that auton-

omy somehow entails a right to ignore the consequences of one's decisions).
191 Cf Chernew et al., supra note 136, at 602 (discussing the concern of "whether being
confronted with financial considerations lowers utility beyond the inherent disutility associated with paying"); Wendy Levinson et al., Not All Patients Want to Participatein Decision
Making: A National Study of Public Preferences, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 531, 531 (2005)

("[H]alf of the respondents (52%) preferred to leave final decisions to their physicians . . . ."). But see Lesley F. Degner & Catherine Aquino Russell, Preferencesfor Treatment
Control AmongAdults with Cancer, 11 REs. NURSING & HEALTH 367, 372 (1988) (pointing out

that most patients preferred to share decision-making control with their doctor).
192 See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE Is LEss (2004)
(using contemporary psychological studies to argue that eliminating choices may reduce

consumer anxiety).
193 There is robust psychological literature on this point. See, e.g.,John T. Cacioppo &
Richard E. Petty, The Need for Cognition, 42 J. PERSONALFY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 116, 116-17
(1982).
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Perhaps some prefer the luxury of deciding under conditions of
moral hazard, which the split benefit undermines. In principle, those
people could pay extra for health insurance policies that reduced
their range of choices by keeping benefits nonfungible. If there is
market and political demand for that service, the health care industry
can provide it.
Still, there may be situations where the patient cannot decide
whether to consume a treatment and where someone else, such as a
parent or next of kin, decides on the patient's behalf. The split benefit proposal may create a conflict of interest if that substituted decision
maker receives the benefit of the cash payment (either through expropriation or inheritance), while the patient receives any benefit of
the treatment. 19 4 It may be best to limit the split benefit program to
only those situations where the patient is competent to make treatment decisions. Still, traditional cost-sharing obligations already impose these sorts of dilemmas on substituted decision makers who
would rather keep the money. Even worse, traditional cost-sharing obligations, unlike the split benefit, may be so onerous that they deny
access to the expensive care altogether.
C.

Welfare and Health Exceptionalism

Ezekiel Emanuel put the proposition simply: "The more we
spend on health care, the less we can spend on other things we
value."19 5 By simply making a cash transfer, the split benefit facilitates
our trades to higher value and thereby makes us better off.
Some patients have preferences for aggressive care, which the
split benefit and the status quo equally satisfy. The split benefit payment also satisfies other patient preferences.' 9 6 The split benefit provides a way "to reduce spending while improving the quality of end-oflife care by ensuring that patient preferences are followed more
closely."1 9 7
A similar problem arises in the social security context. See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PUB.
GUIDE FOR REPRESENTATIVE PAYEES 6 (2009), available at http://ssa.gov/
pubs/10076.html (describing restrictions on the use of benefits by "representative payees"). See generally Kurt C. Kleinschmidt, Elder Abuse: A Review, 30 ANNALS EMERGING MED.
463, 464 (1997) (describing financial abuse through the improper use of government benefits as a modern form of elder abuse). Public and private insurers should be required to
disclose such payments, just as banks and individuals are currently required to disclose the
receipt of cash payments of over $10,000. See 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (2006) (placing a disclosure
mandate on banks); 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (2006) (placing a similar mandate on individuals).
195
Emanuel, supra note 5.
196
See Pauly, Indemnity Insurance, supra note 171, at 53 ("The market, in its own way,
provides information about individual preferences. When people decide to buy or not to
buy, or to offer for sale or not offer for sale, they indicate what things are worth to them.").
197
GOODMAN ET AL., THE DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH PoucY & CLINICAL PRACTICE,
194
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Still, medical literacy will remain a problem. We know, for example, that most patients undergoing chemotherapy overestimate its potential benefits, supposing that it is curative when it is not.' 98 Even
with a split benefit, patients will continue to make bad choices-sometimes consuming a drug or device that they would be better off declining and sometimes declining a drug or device that they would be
better off consuming. The split benefit may change the relative shares
of these two types of errors.19 9 Regardless of the split benefit, physicians, insurers, and policymakers should create a "choice architecture," consisting of second opinions, counseling services, and
consumer information to assist patients with the decision-making
process. 200
More particularly, one might worry that the particular form of
the split benefit payment-a $10,000 check-may bias patients away
from treatments with benefits that are likely to accrue more gradually.2 0 Policymakers could require that splits be paid as annuities with
payments spread over the same period of benefit that would be provided by treatment. It bears emphasis, however, that the rational insurer will pay splits that are small relative to the total cost of the
procedure, which allows patients to irrationally double or even quintuple the subjective value of the cash while still erring on the side of
the treatment.
The poorest patients also present a particular concern. The poor
patient's alternative consumption choices for food or housing are
more pressing than those of the median patient. This makes the poor
patient more likely to decline care in order to pursue those alternatives. Insurers could scale split benefit payments according to patient
wealth, but that may appear unfair. With same-size splits, the benefits
of a fungible payment will be greatest for the poor, precisely because
those alternative consumption options-such as food or housingILLNEss 2 (Bronner ed., 2011) [hereinafter DARTMOUTH INsr.], availableat http:/
/www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/EOL.Trend_Reportl0411.pdf.
198 See Jane C. Weeks et al., Patients'ExpectationsAbout Effects of Chemotherapy for Advanced
Cancer,367 N. ENG. J. MED 1616, 1620 (2012).
199 For an example of such a criticism of consumer directed health care generally, see
Bloche, supra note 125, at 1320 ("The consumer-directed model pushes back against this
quality improvement strategy by calling on patients to plan their own care. Its cost-sharing
requirements discourage patients from compliance with coordinated care based on best
practices.").
200 See Chernew et al., supra note 136, at 603 ("Frequently, patients are provided with
literature that describes treatment options. More recently, researchers have begun to produce sophisticated decision assistance tools in media such as interactive video to facilitate
patient input into the decision-making process."). See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra
note 148, at 81 (discussing choice architecture).
201 See generally George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting,in CHOICE OVER
TIME 57, 57-62 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992) (discussing the tendency to
devalue future benefits).
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will actually be better for the poor patient than expensive health care.
Even if we focused exclusively on health outcomes, evidence suggests
that investments in housing, diet, and education may prove more effective than investments in expensive medical interventions. 20 2 If the
choice is hard, it is because the alternatives are attractive.
It would be difficult to motivate a broader paternalistic critique of
the split benefit based on a worry about patients foregoing needed
treatments. First, even if one allows the paternalist to ignore cost, the
paternalist lacks proof of efficacy for many of these expensive treatments or proof of improved efficacy over the standard of care. As
such, the paternalist cannot say that the drug or device is on net more
helpful to the patient. 203 Even for those treatments that are proven to
be more effective, given a pluralism about ultimate values, it may not
be irrational for a patient to prefer a treatment plan that is less invasive and less expensive. 20 4 There is already wide heterogeneity in decisions about how to treat and cope with severe illness, and the split
benefit will just move the median patient marginally across that
spectrum. 2 05
More fundamentally, this sort of paternalistic objection, if merited, would undermine traditional cost-sharing policies, which utilize
the same opportunity cost mechanism but are stymied by the wealth
effects discussed above. Implicitly, the paternalist would have to maintain that all health care decisions, or perhaps all consumption decisions, be made under conditions of absolute moral hazard. Such a
theory ignores scarcity and the practical need for someone to weigh
the benefits against the costs. 2 06
A related objection would invoke the specialness of health. One
might argue, as Amartya Sen has, that "health is among the most im202
See Clare Bambra et al., Tackling the Wider Social Determinants of Health and Health
Inequalities:Evidencefrom Systematic Reviews, 64J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 284,
285-89 (2010).
203 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
204 See Ken Murray, How Doctors Die: It's Not Like the Rest of Us, But It Should Be, Z6cALo
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://zocalopublicsquare.org/thepublicsquare/2011/11/30/howdoctors-die/read/nexus/ ("Hospice care, which focuses on providing terminally ill patients with comfort and dignity rather than on futile cures, provides most people with
much better final days. Amazingly, studies have found that people placed in hospice care
often live longer than people with the same disease who are seeking active cures.").

205

See generally DARTMOUTH INST., supra note 197, at 1-3 (finding that changes in end-

of-life treatment for Medicare beneficiaries with severe chronic illnesses between 2000 and
2007 varied significantly between regions and hospitals).
206 For a discussion of the move toward a population-based bioethics, see Dan W.
Brock, Considerations of Equity in Relation to Prioritizationand Allocation of Health Care Resources, in ETHics, EQUITY AND THE RENEWAL OF WHO's HEALTH-FOR-ALL STRATEGY 60, 60
(Z. Bankowski,J.H. Bryant &J. Gallagher eds., 1997) (arguing for an analysis of equity and
utility that incorporates "the full ethical complexity of achieving equity in the prioritization
and distribution of health-care resources").
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portant conditions of human life and a critically significant constituent of human capabilities which we have reason to value."2 0 7 Thus, it
may seem perverse for the split benefit policy to facilitate patients
trading health care in favor of other goods, such as housing or even
jewelry. As a scholar in a related context has said, "the money is given
for certain purposes and not others, and it would be considered an
abuse to use it for something else, even if that were preferred." 208
This critique does not bear scrutiny. People buy insurance to ensure future access to care that they otherwise could not afford.2 0 9 Ex
ante, consumers need not know whether they will actually want to consume a given drug for a given disease that they may someday suffer.
But rational consumers want the option to consume such drugs when
they become better informed by their actual experience of the situation.2 10 Ex post, having secured the option, a rational consumer may
nonetheless prefer to spend that benefit on other things.2 1 ' The split
benefit is perfectly congruent with the option-buying purpose of insurance. It has the side benefits of increasing patient wealth and reducing insurance costs along the way.
As Sen himself recognizes, "[w]hat is particularly serious as an
injustice is the lack of opportunity that some may have to achieve good
health because of inadequate social arrangements, as opposed to, say,
a personal decision not to worry about health in particular." 212 Likewise, courts and commentators have recognized that Congress created
Medicare "to insure that adequate medical care is availableto the aged
throughout this country."2 13 Even if the purpose of health insurance
were much narrower, it is not necessarily true that the means to that

207
Amartya Sen, Why Health Equity?, 11 HEALTH EcON. 659, 660 (2002); see also Norman Daniels, justice, Health, and Healthcare, 1 Am. J. BIOETHICS 2, 3 (2001) (arguing that

health care allows people to fully participate in all spheres of their social lives).
208 Jonathan Wolff, Cognitive Disability in a Society ofEquals, in COGNITIVE DISABILITY AND
ITs CHALLENGE TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 147, 150 (Eva Feder Kittay & Licia Carlson eds.,
2010); see also Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 185, 243 (1981) (developing the thought experiment of a paraplegic violinist who

prefers a violin over health care).
209
See generally NYMAN, supra note 131, at 2 (describing the purchase of health care as a
transfer of income); Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM.J.L. & MED. 7,11 (2010) (developing the concept

of "health redistribution").
210
See Romley et al., supra note 61, at 683.
211
SeeJost, supra note 2, at 582 (discussing such changes in perspective).
212
Sen, supra note 207, at 660 (emphasis added).
213
Hultzman v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 1276, 1281 (3d Cir. 1974) (emphasis added); see
alsoJames M. Peterson, Massachusetts Medical Society v. Dukakis: Are MedicareBeneficiaries
Better Off?, 14J. CONTEMP. L. 151, 155 (1988) (recognizing a similar purpose of the Medicare Act).
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end must be so narrowly circumscribed.2 1 4 If the split benefit reduces
health insurance costs, it may facilitate broader, more robust, and
more sustainable health coverage over the long run.
CONCLUSIONS

The split benefit is a way to reduce the cost of health insurance,
or could be a way to increase access and coverage at the same cost.
We can save money without impinging on the advisory role of physicians, the autonomous choices of patients, or patients' access to care.
In some instances, we should replace onerous traditional cost-sharing
obligations with split benefit payments, which are instead painless for
patients. In other instances, we should supplement traditional cost
sharing with split benefit payments, which will increase the opportunity cost-signal beyond the level of traditional cost sharing.
The split benefit presents an opportunity to improve the efficiency of the larger economy. As Bill Sage has argued, "we seem finally to have reached the point at which spending more on health
care means denying our other material needs. Stagnant wages for
many middle-class Americans, for example, may in part reflect the rising cost of employer-sponsored health coverage crowding out cash
raises in workplaces."2 15 The split benefit reduces that distortion and
returns some of the wages to the workers. It does so ex ante, by reducing insurance premiums for the same coverage, and ex post, by allowing people to choose for themselves how they wish to spend some
of their insurance benefits.

214

See Betsey A. Kuhn et al., Policy Watch: The Food Stamp Program and Welfare Reform, 10

J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 192 ("While all of the food stamps are spent on food, funds previously
spent on food are reallocated to other needs, such as rent, clothing or medical care.").
215 Sage, supra note 66, at 103 (footnote omitted); see also Baicker & Chandra, supra
note 20, at 17 (discussing evidence "suggesting that we may be spending too much on
health relative to other goods."); Emanuel, supra note 5 ("Over the past 30 years, health
care inflation has been a major reason average wages have remained stagnant.").

964

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:921

